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ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS ON THE 





This paper investigates the wealth effects of private equity (PE) investor purchases of shares 
in German quoted companies. It is the first study to analyze these effects for the German 
market which is particularly interesting due to its distinct characteristics with regard to the 
ownership structure of publicly listed companies and the protection of minority shareholders. 
We find that PE investors generate positive wealth effects for target shareholders of 5.90% 
around the event day (t = -1 to t = 0). In addition, we find that the wealth effects of PE 
investor  involvement  in  Germany  are  positively  related  to  the  target‟s  tax  liabilities  and 
degree of undervaluation and negatively related to the target‟s leverage and the shareholding 
of the second largest ownership block. The latter effect can be interpreted as a supplementary 
monitoring effect of the management or a monitoring effect of the largest shareholder through 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
 
In  recent  years,  private  equity  investments  on  public  capital  markets  have  gained 
importance which is partly due to an increasing number of public to private transactions. 
According  to  the  Centre  for  Management  Buyout  Research,  there  has  been  a  significant 
increase in public to private transactions in the US, UK and continental Europe since the early 
1980s. The first peak occurred in the mid-to-late 1980s with the second one coming around 
the  year  2000  with  another  upward  trend  from  2003,  CMBOR  (2007).  A  number  of 
explanations have been proposed for this increase including, for example, the gaining of the 
support  of  existing  shareholders  through  irrevocable  commitments,  Wright,  Weir  and 
Burrows  (2007)  and  the  feeling  that  smaller  quoted  companies  tend  to  be  ignored  by 
institutional investors, Weir et al (2007). A further important factor has been the presence of 
private equity investors that have been willing to finance deals. For example, in a US study, 
Cotter and Peck (2001) found that 62.5% of their sample of buyouts involved private equity 
investors. Data provided by the Centre for Management Buyout Research, covering the period 
1998-2006, show that 63% of going private transactions in the UK involved a private equity 
investor.  
 
In the context of the increasing relevance of private equity investments on public capital 
markets,  we  provide  the  first  analysis  of  the  impact  of  private  equity  investors  on  the 
shareholders‟ wealth of a continental European country, namely Germany. An understanding 
of the impact of private equity share purchases is important because they account for 25% of 
the deals in which at least a 25% stake was bought. 
 
 
The German capital market has different characteristics to those of the US and the UK. 
The key differences involve the development of public equity markets, patterns of ownership 
structure, and minority shareholder protection. In contrast to other major economies, such as 
the US, the UK, and Japan, the number of exchange listed German companies is compara-
tively  low.  As  a  consequence,  banks  and  other  financial  institutions  act  as  the  primary 
suppliers of external capital for corporations. In addition, the typical market listed German 
firm  is  characterized by a small number of large shareholders.  Franks and Mayer (2001) 
observe that “85% of the largest quoted companies have a single shareholder owning more   3 
than 25% of the voting shares”
1 (based on 171 companies in 1990). This percentage seems to 
be  stable  over  time  (at  least  for  non-financial  companies).  In  a  study  based  on  all  non-
financial companies listed on the „official‟ trading segment of the Frankfurt stock exchange 
between 1997 and 2004 (264 companies), Andres (2007) states that the percentage observed 
by Franks and Mayer (2001) is strikingly consistent with ownership patterns 15 years later, 
“with 84.5% of the firms featuring a shareholder with a stake of more than 25%.”  
 
According to the law and finance literature, the protection of shareholders‟ rights and 
interests is crucial for the development of a country‟s financial markets. This view is based on 
the rationale that outside investors are willing to pay more for financial assets if their rights 
are better protected by the law. La Porta, Lopez-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) state that 
the degree to which equity investors in Germany are protected by the law is comparatively 
low.  On  the  other  hand,  creditors  are  better  protected,  which  contributes  to  the  view  of 
Germany as a bank-based economy. If shareholder rights are not well protected by the law, 
ownership by large investors can be an effective way of protecting shareholders‟ interests. 
Due to their large stake, these investors both have the power and the incentives to monitor 
management.
2 However, concentrated ownership can also imply potential drawbacks. Large 
shareholders can use their control rights in order to maximize their own utility, which might, 
through the extraction of private benefits, come at the expense of other shareholders. In line 
with  these  arguments,  Bebchuk  (1999)  shows  in  a  theoretical  model  that  in  corporat e 
governance systems such as Germany, in which private benefits of control are significant, the 
ownership structure is characterized by larger blockholders who extract those private benefits 
of control.  
 
In addition, Thomsen, Pedersen and Kvist (2006) find a negative effect of blockholder 
ownership on firm value in continental Europe. With the exception of founding families, 
Andres (2008) finds that blockholders affect firm performance adversely or at least do not 
have a positive performance effect (depending on the type of blockholder) on German firms. 
However, empirical evidence suggests that firms with a second influential blockholder suffer 
less  from  the  extraction  of  private  benefits  through  large  shareholders.  Edwards  and 
Weichenrieder (2004) show empirically that the equity stake of a second largest shareholder 
                                                 
1 According to the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), a stake of 25% provides a blocking minority and 
allows the blockholder to prevent far reaching decisions of the general shareholders‟ meeting, like issues of new 
shares. 
2 Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that large investors provide a solution to the free-rider problem.   4 
increases firm value and interpret their findings as evidence in favour of a monitoring effect 
of the largest shareholder. 
 
These arguments indicate that institutional characteristics may play an important role in 
the  investment  decisions  of  private  equity  firms  and  should  be  included  in  an  empirical 
examination.  The  German  market  is  also  of  interest  because,  despite  of  its  smaller  size 
compared to the UK market, Andres, Betzer and Weir (2007) show that Germany has the 
second largest European leveraged buyout market in terms of value.  
 
Our paper makes a number of contributions to the academic literature. First, a number of 
recent papers have analysed the workings of the German capital markets, for example, Bessler 
(1999) who found a significant equity premium and Franzke (2004), Bessler and Kurth (2007) 
and Bessler and Thies (2007) who investigated the performance effects of venture-backed 
German IPOs. This study is the first to investigate the wealth effects of private equity investor 
purchases of shares in German quoted companies. In their role as buyout specialists, private 
equity firms provide a degree of expertise that will result in more active monitoring, Wright 
and Robbie (1998) and Cotter and Peck (2001). In addition, private equity investors have been 
shown  to  improve  post-buyout  performance  which  indicates  more  effective  monitoring, 
Kaplan (1989b). The question remains whether these effects also occur when private equity 
firms invest in publicly listed companies. Our study is the first to analyze these effects for the 
German market which is particularly interesting due to its distinct characteristics with regard 
to the ownership structures, the development of its equity market and the legal protection of 
equity holders.  
 
Second,  it  identifies  factors  that  explain  the  extent  of  shareholder  wealth  effects  in 
Germany. Third, we investigate the extent to which the conflict of interest between large and 
small shareholders is more severe than the conflict between management and shareholders in 
Germany. The German capital market is characterized by large blockholders which tend to be 
either families or other quoted companies, Franks and Mayer (2001), Andres (2008). Franks 
and  Mayer  (2001)  find  empirical  evidence  for  Germany  in  favour  of  significant  private 
benefits of control for large blockholders. In addition, Erhardt and Nowak (2003) as well as 
Andres (2008) show that family owners of companies listed on the German stock market 
often want to extract private control rights.  
   5 
Our sample is representative of the German public equity market with 83% of our firms 
having  one  or  more  shareholders  owning  a  stake  of  more  than  25%,  and  in  42%  of  the 
companies, either a family or a private individual holds at least a blocking minority. We find 
that private equity investors generate positive wealth effects for target shareholders of 5.90% 
around the event window, t=-1 to t=0. This figure is consistent with 5.95% over the same t=-1 
to t=0 event window for continental European takeovers, Goergen and Renneboog (2004). We 
find that the short term gains persist with CARs of 14.95% over the period t=-20 to t=+20.  
 
As hypothesised, we find that the wealth effects of private equity investor involvement in 
Germany are greater the higher the target‟s tax liabilities, suggesting greater potential tax 
savings. Wealth effects are also positively related to the extent of the target‟s undervaluation. 
Undervaluation makes companies particularly attractive to private equity investors because 
they can bring their expertise to bear to improve the performance of the company by, for 
example, improving efficiency, divesting poorly performing parts of the business and setting 
higher  performance  targets.  Private  equity  investor  expertise  will  enable  them  to  identify 
undervalued  firms,  which  suggests  that  they  might  have  private  information  about  the 
company and its intrinsic value.  
 
Our results also support Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Zingales (1994) who report 
that large shareholders may use their voting power in order to generate private benefits of 
control.  This  can  particularly  be  true  in  our  sample  where  83%  of  the  sample  firms  are 
controlled  by  a  large  shareholder.  Furthermore,  Edwards  and  Weichenrieder  (2004)  find 
empirical evidence for Germany that the equity holdings of the second largest shareholder 
increase the shareholder value of large German corporations. They interpret their finding as 
either a supplementary monitoring effect of the management or a monitoring effect of the 
largest shareholder and thereby reducing their private benefits of control. Consistent with the 
above, we find that wealth gains are lower the higher the shareholding of the second largest 
ownership block. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents possible sources of wealth effects by 
PE investors and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data sources used in 
our study and, in addition, presents key descriptive statistics of our dataset. Section 4 then 
lays out the methodology and the key results of our event study. Section 5 presents the results   6 
of the regression analysis. The determinants of the cumulative abnormal returns are described, 
then the robustness checks are presented. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2   POSSIBLE SOURCES OF WEALTH EFFECTS AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
 
A number of studies have evaluated the shareholder wealth impacts of buyouts. First, 
from  the perspective of cumulative average abnormal  returns  and second in  terms  of the 
premium paid. In the US, positive returns to shareholders have been found by DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Rice (1984), Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Frankfurter and Gunay (1992) and 
Travlos and Cornett (1993). Positive returns were reported for Europe, Andres, Betzer and 
Weir  (2007)  and  for  the  UK,  Renneboog,  Simons  and  Wright  (2007).  In  relation  to  the 
premium paid, significant premiums were found in US studies by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Rice (1984), Kaplan (1989a) and Easterwood, Singer, Seth and Lang (1994). Weir, Laing and 
Wright (2005) reported significant results for the UK and Betzer (2006) for Europe. However, 
there has been no study that has specifically analysed the impact on shareholder wealth of 
private equity investors  purchasing a significant ownership holding on the German Stock 
Market.  
 
PE investors are specialists in the buyout market and are associated with bringing greater 
managerial discipline to firms they become involved with, Wright and Robbie (1998) and 
Cotter and Peck (2001). The purchase of a significant ownership stake, one which is above the 
threshold for disclosure, is an important signal to management, and the market, that there are 
potential  gains  to  be  realised.  Therefore,  private  equity  investors‟  decisions  to  buy  a 
significant ownership stake in a company may have an impact on the wealth of shareholders. 
We analyse the following effects that may occur as a result of an investment by a private 
equity investor: control effects (linked to the free float, the presence of another single large 
shareholder and the relative size of large shareholdings); the reduction of agency costs as a 
result  of  incentive  realignment;  firm  undervaluation;  how  far  financial  restructuring  can 
improve  performance  (measured  by  company  debt,  the  share  price,  tax  liability  and  the 
stability of cash flows). 
 
The German capital market is characterised by highly concentrated ownership. Franks 
and Mayer (2001) report that 85% of the largest companies have a single shareholder owning 
more than 25% of the voting shares with Andres (2007) finding the figure to be 84.5%. These   7 
figures show that German share ownership is much more concentrated that other countries 
such as the US and the UK which have a more dispersed ownership, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986). The impact of such a concentrated ownership on the wealth of target companies is 
investigated in relation to two hypotheses, monitoring and incentive realignment.  
 
2.1 Monitoring Hypotheses: 
Our first monitoring hypothesis argues that individual shareholdings in excess of 25% 
represent a sufficient incentive to overcome the free rider problem. The problem, identified by 
Grossman and Hart (1980), shows that effective monitoring will not occur if ownership is 
widely  held.  This  is  because  monitoring  will  incur  substantial  costs  for  relatively  small 
rewards in the case of small shareholder undertakings. In contrast, the inactive shareholders 
collectively gain much more but provide no input into the process, hence they free ride.  
 
Families  or  institutions  will  undertake  effective  monitoring  because  of  the  financial 
incentives  involved.  The  German  equity  market  is  characterized  by  large  shareholders 
controlling the majority of a company‟s equity capital. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that 
those large shareholders provide an effective solution to the free rider problem because the 
benefits  of improved monitoring should outweigh the costs. Support  for this  comes from 
Renneboog, Simons and Wright (2007) who find that wealth gains are lower in UK going 
private transactions the more concentrated the external ownership. In addition, Andres, Betzer 
and Weir (2007) report that wealth gains are higher in European LBOs when ownership is 
more diffuse.  
 
Franks and Mayer (2001) argue that there is an active market in share blocks and that the 
gains tend to accrue to the large block holders. Indirect support for this comes from Wright, 
Weir  and  Burrows  (2007)  who  find  that  irrevocable  commitments  are  important  for  the 
success of going private transactions.  In addition, Franks and Mayer (2001) find that the 
premium paid to blockholders is lower than to non-blockholders in the UK. We argue that 
private equity investors prefer to buy equity stakes from large blockholding investors. This 
will reduce transactions costs and achieve the desired ownership stake much more quickly. If 
the objective is to buy control, the backing of significant shareholders also sends a signal to 
the market that the private equity investor has the support of these blockholders.  
   8 
We measure the variable stake1 as the equity stake of the largest equity holder. We expect 
that  the  wealth  effects  will  be  negatively  related  to  large  individual  shareholdings  and 
therefore the first hypothesis is:  
 
H1 (stake1): The abnormal returns are lower for firms with an active investor such as a 
family or another corporation.  
 
On the other hand, Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Zingales (1994) find empirical 
evidence  that  large  shareholders  may  use  their  voting  power  in  order  to  generate  private 
benefits of control. This can be particularly true in our sample where 83% of the sample firms 
are controlled by a large shareholder. Furthermore, Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004) find 
empirical evidence for Germany that the equity holdings of the second largest shareholder 
increase the shareholder value of large German corporations. They interpret their finding as 
either a supplementary monitoring effect of the management or a monitoring effect of the 
largest shareholder and thereby reducing their private benefits of control. 
 
Therefore, there will be fewer gains to be made when the private equity investor buys a 
stake in such a company and hence wealth effects will be lower. The second hypothesis is:  
 
H2 (stake2): The larger the equity stake of the second largest shareholder, the lower are 
the private benefits of the largest shareholder. Therefore, we expect the share price 
reaction to be negatively correlated with the equity stake of the second largest 
shareholder.  
 
2.2 Incentive Alignment Hypothesis: 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the separation of ownership and control leads to a 
conflict of interests between managers and owners. Managers aim to maximise their utility 
and shareholders want to maximise their wealth. Low managerial shareholdings mean that 
discretionary behaviour is more attractive to management than company performance because 
the  rewards  gained  by  better  performance  do  not  accrue  to  the  management  but  to 
shareholders. As a consequence, low managerial ownership causes incentive misalignment 
and  leads  to  higher  agency  costs.  Alternatively,  higher  managerial  shareholdings  create 
greater  financial  incentives  to  pursue  wealth  maximising  policies  because  it  reduces  the 
incentive to shirk, Weir and Laing (1998). Support for this comes from Maupin (1987) who   9 
found that management buyouts (MBOs) had higher managerial shareholdings. Renneboog, 
Simons and Wright (2005) find the wealth effects in UK public to private transaction are 
negatively related to managerial ownership. 
 
Therefore, if private equity investors buy into firms with large managerial shareholdings, 
there will be less scope for incentive realignment and lower wealth gains. In contrast, private 
equity  investors  buying  into  a  firm  with  low  managerial  shareholdings  will  result  in 
significant positive wealth effects because of the higher agency costs. In this case, there will 
be considerable opportunities for the private equity investors to bring pressure to bear on the 
firm‟s  management  to  improve  performance.  Weir,  Wright  and  Scholes  (2008)  find  that 
private equity firms are significantly more likely to be involved in firms with lower board 
ownership. This suggests private equity firms can address agency problems in this type of 
ownership structure. The third hypothesis is:  
 
H3 (management): Higher managerial ownership before the announcement of the private 
equity investment leads to smaller abnormal returns.  
 
However, in contrast to the Jensen and Meckling (1976) convergence-of-interest model 
discussed above, a number of studies document a non-linear relationship between managerial 
stockholdings and firm performance suggesting that managers might be entrenched at higher 
ownership stakes. These studies include Morck, Shleifer and Vishny. (1988) and McConnell 
and Servaes (1990) for the US and Short and Keasey (1999) and Weir, Laing and McKnight 
(2002) for the UK. We therefore control for a possible nonlinear relationship by including a 
squared term. 
 
Based on our data on blockholdings, we only employ managerial shareholdings in excess 
of 5% in our analysis because of data restrictions. The expected coefficient of the variable 
management is negative while the coefficient of management
2 is expected to be positive. We 
therefore hypothesise: 
 
H4 (management2): The relationship between managerial equity stake and abnormal 
returns is nonlinear. 
 
2.3 Control Variables:   10 
We next discuss variables that were shown to be important drivers of wealth effects in the 
empirical private equity literature and which will serve as controls in our study. 
 
2.3.1 Undervaluation 
A number of studies have provided empirical and anecdotal evidence that firms going 
private suffer from stock market undervaluation, for example, Maupin, Bidwell and Ortegren 
(1984) for the US, Weir, Laing and Wright (2005) for the UK and Andres, Betzer and Weir 
(2007)  for  Europe.  Undervaluation  has  a  number  of  potential  sources  including  financial 
invisibility. This occurs when quoted companies are small and do not receive the coverage, 
either in the financial press or from financial analysts, that larger quoted companies receive. 
This exacerbates the problem of getting accurate information to the market about the firm‟s 
performance. The lack of visibility increases the thinness of the market for the firm‟s shares 
and management perceive that the stock market does not provide an accurate fundamental 
valuation of the firm, Weir, Wright and Scholes (2008).  Further, if there is no other evidence 
of other potential buyers, managers will welcome the private equity investors‟ share purchase 
and send a positive sign to the market. In addition, markets might overreact and temporarily 
depress a company‟s share price below a “fairly priced” level particularly if there is negative 
sentiment about the sector. 
 
Undervaluation  makes  companies  particularly  attractive  to  private  equity  investors 
because they can bring their expertise to bear to improve the performance of the company by, 
for example, improving efficiency, divesting poorly performing parts  of the business  and 
setting  higher  performance  targets.  Private  equity  investor  expertise  will  enable  them  to 
identify  undervalued  firms,  which  suggests  that  they  have  private  information  about  the 
company  and  its  true  value,  CMBOR  (1999)  and  Weir,  Wright  and  Scholes  (2008).  The 
greater the undervaluation, the greater the potential gains for shareholders.  
 
The numerator of the control variable undervaluation is defined as the ratio of the closing 
market price two months prior to the announcement of the private equity investment divided 
by the average price, measured over 250 trading days counting backwards from two months 
prior  to  the  announcement  of  the  private  equity  investment.  In  order  to  exclude  market 
movements we divide this figure by the equivalent ratio of the C-DAX, the broadest index 
representing  the  German  stock  market.  The  expected  coefficient  for  undervaluation  is 
negative.   11 
 
2.3.2 Leverage 
Jensen (1986) argues that buy-outs, financed by debt, will create an organisational form 
that prevents the consumption of perquisites and the undertaking of non-optimal investment. 
Management have a commitment to repay the increased coupon on the debt so that future cash 
flows cannot be used sub-optimally. Debt providers have an incentive to increase monitoring 
and if the interest on the debt is not paid, they can put the company into liquidation, with 
shareholders  having  little  chance  of  recovering  the  value  of  their  shareholding  (Citron, 
Wright, Ball and Rippington, 2003).  
 
There is evidence that MBOs result in increased debt, Kaplan (1989a), Opler (1993) and 
Desbrieres and Schatt (2002). The Centre for Management Buyout Research report that in 
2006, debt accounted for 51.2% of all European MBO/MBI financing.  The figure rises to 
64.6% if other forms of debt, for example mezzanine finance, are included. The UK figures 
were  50.0%  and  63.9%  respectively.  In  addition  to  these  findings  on  buyouts,  empirical 
studies focussing on public to private transactions are also relevant. Weir, Wright and Scholes 
(2008) found that in the UK firms going private had lower debt ratios than firms remaining 
public. 
 
As  an  important  element  in  the  buy-out  process,  private  equity  investment  implies  a 
substantial increase in leverage ratios with the increased debt bringing greater discipline to 
management, Wright and Robbie (1998). We proxy this by using the ratio of net debt to the 
book value of total assets. Net debt is the sum of long and short term debt less cash and 
marketable securities. The lower the ratio the more the company can cope with increased debt 
in the future and the more the management can be disciplined with the help of leverage. The 
expected coefficient of the variable leverage is negative.  
 
2.3.3 Tax shield 
Given that interest payments in Germany are tax deductible, it is reasonable to assume 
that  private  equity  investors  will  restructure  the  financing  side  in  order  to  increase  the 
company‟s  tax  shield.  Kaplan  (1989a)  and  Lowenstein  (1985)  argue  that  the  „tax  benefit 
hypothesis‟ is one of the most important motivations for private equity investors. High tax 
firms  will  reduce  their  liability  as  a  result  of  the  increased  debt.  Kaplan  (1989a)  found 
significant tax benefits after going private. Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg (1999) found   12 
that high tax firms were more likely to be involved in leveraged buyouts. However, in the UK, 
Weir, Laing and Wright (2005) found no relationship between tax and the decision to go 
private, a finding which supports Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Kieschnick (1998) for the US.  
 
The  evidence  relating  to  the  tax  benefit  hypothesis  is  therefore  mixed.  Although  the 
majority of our sample firms are not taken private, we propose that the tax benefit hypothesis 
holds and that private equity investors are likely to implement changes in the capital structure 
as part of their investment strategy. In the construction of the control variable taxshield we 
follow Lehn and Poulsen (1989). We use the firm‟s (net) tax payments standardized by the 
firm‟s  market  value  of  equity  in  the  fiscal  year  prior  to  the  buyout  announcement.  The 
expected coefficient is positive.   
 
2.3.4 Risk 
In line with the arguments above, private equity investors look for companies in which 
additional loans can be taken up. This, in turn, leads to higher levels of obligations towards 
debt holders who might take control if they do not receive their interest payments. In order to 
increase  leverage,  private  equity  target-companies  should,  therefore,  have  predictable  and 
stable cash flows. The degree to which companies are exposed to volatile and cyclical markets 
is  measured  by  the  standard  deviation  of  stock  returns  (over  two  years).  The  expected 
coefficient is negative.  
 
3  DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The  data  covers  the  period  June  1998  to  June  2007.  We  have  constructed  a  unique 
database that includes all of the initial acquisitions by private equity investors of ownership 
stakes larger than 25%  in exchange-listed German companies. This gives a sample of 48 
private equity acquisitions. According to Deutsche Boerse AG 850 companies were listed on 
the three segments Prime Standard, General Standard and Entry Standard on 30
th of June 
2007.  The  initial  sample  was  identified  through  a  search  of  Reuters  Newswires  and  the 
Merger Market database. In addition, data were matched with shareholding information of the 
German  Financial  Supervisory  Authority  (BaFin).  We  checked  that  there  was  no 
contamination  such  as  other  share  price  sensitive  information  announced  around  the 
announcement date. No such information was found. According to the German Securities   13 
Trading Act  (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) shareholders have to report holdings to the BaFin 
whenever they exceed certain thresholds. Until 2007, the minimum threshold was 5%.
3  
 
In 19 out of  48  cases the target firm was taken private by the private equity investor. 
Examples for going private transactions are Friedrich Grohe AG, Friedrich Flender AG or 
Celanese AG. In all other cases the private equity investor remains a long-term active investor 
in the listed company. However, in some cases (for example, Knuerr AG and Grammer AG) 
the listed companies were sold to strategic investors or to institutional investors after 4 to 5  
years. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the sample. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The data listed in Table 1 are obtained from various sources. Financial data, such as total 
assets, leverage and tax shield are taken directly from each company‟s annual report in the 
fiscal year preceding the announcement of the transaction. Stock market data which is used to 
calculate the variables risk and undervaluation are obtained from Datastream. We further 
collected data on the ownership structure of the firms from Hoppenstedt Aktienführer,
4 which 
lists all investors with a stake of at least 5% of the shares outstanding. The ownership data is 
used in order to calculate the variables management, stake1, stake2 and freefloat. The largest 
individual equity stake, stake1 was, on average, 54.31% and the average size of the second 
largest shareholder, stake2, was 5.73%. An average freefloat of 32.81% confirms one of the 
stylized facts about German firms, namely that shareholdings are comparatively concentrated. 
Managerial average stock ownership which includes holdings of other family members was 
13.02%.  Further  evidence  of  this  is  that  83%  of  our  sample  firms  have  one  or  more 
shareholders which hold more than 25% of the voting shares. 
  
Table 1 also reveals that the market value of the median target firm is about € 70 million. 
The discrepancy between the mean and median values indicates that the sample is skewed. 
About 45% of the sample firms are traded at an equity value of more than € 100 million. The 
average tax paid, taxshield, prior to the private equity investor purchase is 2.55%. We report 
that the standard deviation of the targets‟ share price, risk, was 2.60%. The undervaluation 
                                                 
3 In January 2007, the minimum threshold was lowered to 3%. 
4 The Hoppenstedt Aktienführer is a yearly publication that provides detailed information (e.g., ownership 
structure, board composition, balance sheet information) on German listed firms.   14 
variable indicates that the stock prices of both, the median and average firm in our sample, 
have declined in the period before the announcement of the transaction. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 provides further details about the ownership structures of German firms. It shows 
that the largest percentage of deals, 33.33%, undertaken by private equity investors involved 
buying equity from families or individuals. The average purchase of deals involving highly 
concentrated  ownership  was  79.13%  for  family/individual  owned  businesses.  The  second 
most common source of shares is other corporations, 25% of the deals, with the average 
purchase being 79.88%. We find that only 22.92% of deals involved companies that were 
widely held (i.e. no single investor owns an equity stake larger than 25%) and 77.08% being 
purchased from more closely held companies. These figures are consistent with Franks and 
Mayer (2001) who show that German firms have highly concentrated equity ownership. 
 
4   EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS 
 
4.1  EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY 
 
We expect that the announcement of the purchase of a stake in a publicly listed company 
by a private equity investor will lead to a positive share price reaction. We identify the wealth 
effects for the firms‟ current shareholders by using an event-time methodology. We follow 
Brown and Warner (1985) by applying the market model. For each firm, I, the abnormal 
return (it) on event day t is calculated as the difference between the return on day t (Rit) and 
the expected return (without the announcement), 
 
    mt i i it it R R    ˆ ˆ    ,  (1)
 
where Rmt is the return on the market portfolio on day t. The coefficients i and i are 
OLS estimates obtained from regressions of firm i‟s daily returns on the market return over 
the estimation period from t = -280 till t = - 20 (relative to the announcement day (t = 0)). We 
use the CDAX, a broad, value-weighted German index, as a proxy for the market portfolio. 
 
Daily abnormal announcement returns (AR) are then calculated for each day of the event 
period of 41 days (from t = -20 till t = +20): 
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where N is the total number of sample firms. 
 
The average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the period from T1 to event day T2 
is given by 
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We test the statistical significance of  abnormal  announcement returns and cumulative 
abnormal returns using both, a t-test (see Brown and Warner (1980), appendix A.3) and the 
standardized  cross-sectional  test  suggested  by  Boehmer,  Musumeci,  and  Poulsen  (BMP) 
(1991). In contrast to “traditional” significance tests, the BMP test statistic is robust towards 
event-induced variance increases that bias tests for mean abnormal returns in short-term event 
studies.  Harrington  and  Shrider  (2007)  demonstrate  this  effect  through  simulations  and 
conclude  that  BMP‟s  (1991)  standardized  cross-sectional  test  “is  a  good  candidate  for  a 
robust, parametric test”. 
 
Specifically,  the  BMP  test  requires  security  residuals  to  be  uncorrelated  across  firms 
(which should be noncritical in our application), but – unlike the traditional Brown-Warner 
(1980) method – does not require event-induced variance to be insignificant. To obtain the 



































S    (4) 
 
The term 
2 ˆi  stands for the estimated variance of the abnormal return for firm i during the 
estimation period (length L), and  m R  is the average market return. The test statistic is then 
found  by  dividing  the  average  event-period  standardized  abnormal  return  by  its 




































.  (5) 
 
The test statistic for cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) is obtained accordingly. 
 
 
4.2.  EVENT STUDY RESULTS 
 
 
Table  3  presents  the  results  of  the  event  study.  Column  2  shows  the  average  daily 
abnormal returns, columns 3 and 4 contain our significance tests, the t-statistic and the BMP 
test statistic, respectively. Cumulative abnormal returns over the period [-20 ; + 20, relative to 
the announcement day t = 0] are shown in column 5. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
As reported in Table 3, the announcement of a private equity investor to buy a stake in an 
exchange-listed company leads to significant and positive abnormal returns for shareholders. 
On the announcement day (t = 0) an average abnormal return of 5.90 % is earned. This figure 
is significant (at the 0.01-level) for both, the standard t-test and the BMP test. On the days 
immediately preceding the announcement, average abnormal returns of 1.36% (t = -2) and 
0.125% (t = -1) are earned, again statistically significant at 1%. In most cases, we do not have 
information on the exact time of the day when the announcement reaches the market. As 
commonly applied in event-studies, the period from t = -1 till t = +1 should therefore be 
considered the announcement return. The three-day CAR [-1 ; +1] amounts to 8.83% and is 
again  significant  at  the  1%  level.  Furthermore,  the  relationship  of  positive  and  negative 
abnormal returns around the announcement day confirms that these results are not due to 
outlier observations. 
 
In addition, Table 3 only shows one significant abnormal return after the event period 
ranging from t = -2 till t = +2 (the BMP-statistic is significant on day +18). This means that 
no leakage of information about private equity investments influences share prices prior to the 
announcement day and can be interpreted as evidence for an information-efficient market. All   17 
expected  gains  from  the PE-investors‟ influence seem  to  be  captured during the five-day 
period surrounding the announcement day. 
 
This interpretation is further supported by Table 4, Panel A, which shows the cumulative 
abnormal returns as well as the associated significance tests for different event periods. The 
cumulative abnormal return over the whole event period from t = -20 till t = +20 is 14.95%, 
with a t-statistic of 6.03 and a BMP test statistic of 5.41. Both are significant at the 1% level. 
The whole period CAR figure is only slightly higher than the five-day announcement period 
return [-2 ; +2] of 11.77%, which also shows the highest significance values among the event 
periods included in Table 4. 
 
Having  shown  that  PE  share  purchases  produce  positive  wealth  effects  for  target 
shareholders,  it  is  important  to  compare  these  wealth  effects  with  those  of  non-PE  share 
purchases.  Over  the  sample  period  from  June  1998  to  June  2007  we  identify  all 
announcements of non PE purchases of at least a 25% stake in a market-listed German firm. 
These purchases were made by, for example, banks, insurance companies and industrial firms. 
This gives a control sample of 145 share purchases. Panel B, Table 4 shows that non PE share 
purchases generated announcement returns of 1.76% (statistically significant at the 1% level) 
on the event day and a cumulative abnormal  return of 5.11% over the period [-20; +20] 
(significant at the 5% level). 
 
Panel C compares the CARs of PE-backed and non PE-backed share purchases. We find 
that the cumulative abnormal returns of private equity investments are significantly higher for 
all event windows. These results indicate that market participants seem to attribute a higher 




[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) for PE and non-PE share 
purchases over the period [-20; +20]. We find CARs of around 3% until t = -5 and an increase 
to 5% around t = -2. There is a sharp rise to 12.32% on the day of the announcement with the 
figure reaching 16.03% on t = +3. The figure also shows that non-PE purchases have CARs   18 
below PE purchases throughout the post purchase period. The differences are significant for 
each time window.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
The  event  study  results  are  therefore  consistent  with  our  general  hypothesis  that  the 
announcement of the decision of private equity investors to  buy an equity stake leads  to 
significant abnormal returns. Announcement day abnormal returns are 5.90% and three day 
CARs are 8.83%. From these results, it seems clear that private equity investors generate 
positive wealth effects for the firms‟ shareholders. These wealth gains have been shown to be 
greater than those produced by non-PE share purchases.  In the next section, we examine 
whether  the  different  magnitudes  of  these  abnormal  returns  are  systematically  related  to 
certain characteristics of the target companies. 
 
 
5.  REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
5.1.  DETERMINANTS OF THE CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
In this section, we investigate the determinants of the CARs reported in the previous 
section. We focus on the CARs (-2;2) because this event window is the most significant one 
and captures most of the announcement effect of the private equity investment. In addition to 
the variables explained in section 2 we include controls majority and size. Majority is a binary 
variable taking the value “1” if the private equity investor bought the majority stake in the 
company and “0” if not. Size is defined as the natural logarithm of the firm‟s total assets in the 
year preceding the private equity investment. Table 6 reports estimates of the OLS regression 
of the following empirical model and three extensions: 
 
CAR(-2,+2)i = c0 + c1 stake1i - c2 stake2i - c3 managementi - c4 undervaluationi -  
c5 leveragei + c6 taxshieldi - c7 riski + c8 majorityi - c9 sizei + ei  (6) 
   
where CAR(-2, +2)i is the 5-day
5 cumulated abnormal return for company  i and ei  is the 
error  term.  The  White  Heteroscedasticity  Test  (without  cross-terms)  does  not  reject  the 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity in the residuals (equal error variance).
6 
                                                 
5 The regression results are robust to variations of the event window size.  
6 Tests for heteroscedasticity are conducted using the White Heteroscedasticity Test (without cross -terms). The 
test statistics of all models lie above the 0.10-critical Chi-Square values.    19 
 
Table 5 reports the correlations between the explanatory variables used in the regression 
analysis. It shows that there is no sign of multicollinearity between the explanatory variables 
in  equation  6.  However,  given  the  correlation  coefficient  of  -0.634  between  Stake1  and 
Stake2, we also run separate regressions for each of them as a robustness check. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
We estimate three different model specifications. The first model contains all variables in 
equation  6.  Model  2  includes  year  dummy  variables  (yeardummies)  to  account  for  year-
specific effects. In model 3 we add the squared management variable (management
2) in order 
to  test  for  a  non-linear  relationship  between  the  CARs  and  the  management  stake.  The 
explanatory power of the regressions as measured by the R
2 is in range of 0.49 to 0.60 and 
hence is in line with previous studies such as Renneboog, Simons and Wright (2007) and 
Andres,  Betzer  and  Weir  (2007).  The  F  statistics  in  Table  6  show  that  all  models  are 
statistically significant.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 shows that the variable that represents the voting rights of the largest shareholder 
(stake1) is negative as hypothesized and statistically significant at the 5% level. Consistent 
with hypothesis H2, we find that, the variable that represents the voting rights of the second 
largest shareholder, (stake2), is negative and highly significant in all regressions. The stake2 
result  is  consistent  with  Edwards  and  Weichenrieder  (2004).  Other  large  shareholders 
therefore have an incentive to monitor the largest shareholder because the largest shareholder 
does not necessarily act in the interest of all shareholders. Importantly this finding supports 
our hypothesis that the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders might be 
more severe than the conflict between management and shareholders in Germany.  
 
Given the correlation between Stake1 and Stake2, we reran the regressions with each variable 
entered separately. The results remain the same with Stake1 still negative and significant and 
Stake2 negative and significant at 5%.  
   20 
These findings are new in the going private / private equity literature because this is the 
first  study  that  investigates  a  specific  continental  European  market  with  its  particular 
corporate governance system. The evidence supports the monitoring hypothesis in countries 
characterized by firms with large shareholders. 
 
Second, we find empirical evidence that the shareholder wealth effect is determined by 
the degree of undervaluation before the private equity investment. As hypothesised we find a 
negative and significant relationship between the variable undervaluation and the CARs. This 
finding  reveals  that  private  equity  investors  identify  poorly  performing  companies  and 
enhance shareholder value after becoming an active investor. This result confirms previous 
findings by Weir, Laing and Wright (2005), Renneboog, Simons and Wright (2007) for the 
UK and Andres, Betzer and Weir (2007) for European LBO transactions.  
 
Third, we find strong support for the financial restructuring hypothesis. The CARs are 
higher for firms with lower net debt to total assets ratios. As expected, private equity investors 
can  substantially  increase  the  leverage  ratios  of  those  firms  and  hence  discipline 
management‟s actions. Furthermore, they can increase the tax shield with higher leverage 
ratios. This finding is further supported by our positive tax coefficient which confirms the „tax 
benefit hypothesis‟. Firms with higher tax payments before the private equity investment will 
benefit more from the financial restructuring process. Therefore, there seems to be a wealth 
transfer from the German state to shareholders. These findings are consistent with Kaplan‟s 
(1989a) and Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg‟s (1999) findings for the US and partially 
with Renneboog, Simons and Wright‟s (2007) findings for the UK. 
 
Fourth,  the  regression  results  show  insignificant  coefficients  for  the  variables  risk, 
majority,  size,  management,  management2,  employees  and  all  year  dummies.  The 
insignificant majority variable indicates that the market does not differentiate between deals 
where private equity investors buy the majority stake (a stake larger than 50%) or just a 
significant (a stake larger than 5% but less than 50%) control stake. Furthermore, our findings 
in table 6 show that the wealth effects are not driven by the need to realign the incentives 
within the firm as both variables that proxy managerial stakes are insignificant. This finding 
stands in contrast to Renneboog, Simons and Wright‟s (2007) findings for the UK market but 
supports Andres, Betzer and Weir‟s (2007) findings for the European market. Finally, all time 
dummies in model specification two are insignificant.   21 
 
One  potential  problem  is  that  the  period  over  which  the  undervaluation  variable  is 
calculated overlaps with the estimation window of the event study. This overlap could bias the 
results. Therefore, we estimated an additional regression using the CARs from a simple index 
adjustment model as dependent variable. In this alternative approach, the abnormal returns are 
obtained  by  subtracting  the  C-DAX  returns  from  the  event  window  returns.  Thus,  no 
estimation window is needed. The results from these specifications are not reported as they 
are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the findings presented above. 
 
5.2 ANALYSIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
We develop the analysis by testing a number of additional hypotheses. The results are shown 
in table 7. First, we investigate the extent to which the reputation of the private equity investor 
has an influence on the wealth effects of private equity announcements. Reputation is defined 
as a binary variable taking the value “1” if the private equity investor belongs to the largest 
private equity investors  in  the world  (measured as  having capital  invested larger than $5 
billion)  and  “0”  if  not.  Wright,  Weir  and  Burrows  (2007)  find  evidence  that  irrevocable 
commitments are more likely to be higher the higher the private equity investor‟s reputation. 
Kester and Luehrman (1995) show that reputation is an important factor in the choice of 
private equity investor. Reputation may therefore be linked to the idea of a fair price and so 
we expect that reputation will have a positive coefficient. However, we find that the variable 
is insignificant. 
 
Second, we examine whether there are any significant differences in the abnormal returns if 
the target company is taken private (delisting) or not. Delisting is a binary variable taking the 
value “1” if the private equity investor takes the target firm private and “0” if not. Weir, 
Wright and Scholes (2008) show that 70% of going private transactions in the UK involves a 
private equity investor which indicates that they are active in the purchase of shares in quoted 
companies.  They  also  find  evidence  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  private  equity 
investors are more likely to be involved in deals that have lower potential financial distress 
costs. Hence private equity investors are more likely to get involved with less risky share 
purchases and so we expect the coefficient to be negative. However, we find that taking a 
company private does not affect the wealth impact of the share purchase. 
   22 
Third, we further investigate the free rider problem identified by Grossman and Hart (1980). 
We define ownership concentration in terms of free float which is the firm‟s share capital 
minus the sum of all shareholdings in excess of 5%.
7 A high free float illustrates a diffuse 
ownership and therefore offers the greatest opportunity for we alth gains for private equity 
investors.  We  therefore  expect  that   shareholder  wealth  gains  from  the   private  equity 
investment will be positively related to levels of free float before the acquisition of the private 
equity investor. Model 6 shows a positive and significant relationship between wealth gains 
and the extent of free float.  
 
Fourth, we offer an additional test of hypothesis 1 by investigating the wealth effects created 
by  buying  from different  types  of  seller. We  construct  three  dummy  variables,   family, 
corporation and stock market which are given the value “1” if the private equity investor 
bought the stake in the company from the respective shareholder and “0” if not. The reference 
group for these variables is buying the shareholding from a financial institution. Consistent 
with  hypothesis  1,  we  expect  the  coefficients  for  family  and  corporation  to  be  negative 
because of the active monitoring of the shareholder. In contrast, we expect the variable stock 
market to be positive because buying from the market implies that the purchase has been 
made  from  small  shareholders.  We  find  a  positive,  significant  relationship  between  the 
purchase  of  shares  on  the  open  market  and  the  wealth  effect.  This  indicates  that  the 
purchasing share from a more diffuse group offers greater gains. The coefficients for family 
and corporation are insignificant and show that there is no difference in the wealth gains 
generated when buying from these blockholders. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
5.3  ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
In the following, we address two potential problems of our sample. First, our sample 
contains 48 observations and is therefore rather small. Second, the distributional assumptions 
of  our  CARs  could  be  incorrect  due  to  event  clustering  and  therefore  lead  to  biased 
inferences.  
 
                                                 
7 Until 2007, only ownership stakes above 5% had to be reported to the German Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority (BaFin).   23 
The econometric literature has dealt with these problems in the past. Many studies, for 
example Efron and Tibishirani (1993), Horowitz (2001) and MacKinnon (2002), have drawn 
statistical inferences from small samples from distributions that are calculated by simulations 
rather  than  applying  asymptotic  theory.  These  studies  argue  that  small  sample  statistical 
inference can be based on so called „bootstrap distributions‟. The bootstrap procedure has a 
number of advantages. First, the procedure generates more information about your sample. 
Second, it does not make any distributional assumptions. Third, it can account for event- 
clustering. 
 
The  methodology  of  our  robustness  check  follows  closely  MacKinnon  (2002).
8  The 
bootstrap procedure generates many random samples – in our case 10,000 different bootstrap 
samples – out of our observed random sample of 48 observations. We select each sample 
randomly  from  the  original  sample  with  replacement.  This  procedure  will  generate 
information about our sample of private equity investments that we do not have because we 
artificially  increase  our  observations.  Furthermore,  we  define  24  different  clusters  in  our 
sample where each cluster includes all events with overlapping event windows. For example, 
the creation of one bootstrap sample could start as follows: If we draw one cluster out of our 
24  clusters  and  this  respective  cluster  contains  four  events  we  draw  four  times  with 
replacement out of this cluster in order to create our bootstrap sample. Subsequently, we 
continue to select the remaining 48 elements of this respective bootstrap sample. 
 
Finally, we end up with 10,000 different bootstrap samples and hence, we get 10,000 
different estimates of our regression parameters. Applying the so called bootstrap t procedure 
(see MacKinnon 2002) we get confidence intervals for our original regression coefficients. 
The  regression  coefficient  has  a  significant  influence  on  the  CARs  if  the  zero  is  not  an 
element of the confidence interval. Table 8 reveals the results of our bootstrap simulations. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Table  8  shows  the  regression  coefficients  from  our  first  and  our  seventh  model 
specifications and the confidence intervals for our sample estimates. The results of our robust 
regressions support the inference based on our OLS results. We find that the variables stake1, 
stake2, undervaluation, leverage and taxshield remain significant drivers of the shareholder 
                                                 
8 For a detailed description of the bootstrap procedure see MacKinnon (2002).    24 
wealth effects after the announcement of private equity investments. However, the variable 
stock market falls just short of being statistically significant. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examines the wealth effects of private equity investor purchases of shares in 
public companies quoted on the German capital market. In addition, it sheds light on the 
factors that explain the impact on shareholder wealth by private equity investors. We find that 
private  equity  investors  generate  positive  wealth  effects  for  target  shareholders  of  5.90% 
around the event window, t-1 to t0. This figure is consistent with 5.95% over the same t-1 to 
t0  event  window  for  continental  European  takeovers,  Goergen  and  Renneboog  (2004). 
Significant returns are also reported for t+1, 1.68%, and t+2, 1.59%. We find that the short 
term gains persist with CARs of 14.95% over the period t-20 to t+20.  
 
We also find that the wealth effects of private equity investor involvement in Germany 
are  greater  the  higher  the  target‟s  tax  liabilities,  suggesting  greater  potential  tax  savings. 
Wealth effects are also negatively related to the extent of the target‟s undervaluation, the 
greater the undervaluation, the greater the wealth effect. Undervaluation makes companies 
particularly attractive to private equity investors because they can bring their expertise to bear 
to improve the performance of the company by, for example, improving efficiency, divesting 
poorly performing parts of the business and setting higher performance targets. Private equity 
investor expertise will enable them to identify undervalued firms, which suggests that they 
have private information about the company and its true worth.  
 
Our results also support Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Zingales (1994) who report 
that large shareholders may use their voting power in order to generate private benefits of 
control. This was seen to be particularly important in our sample as 83% of the sample firms 
are controlled by a large shareholder. Furthermore, Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004) find 
empirical evidence for Germany that the equity holdings of the second largest shareholder 
increase the shareholder value of large German corporations. They interpret their finding as 
illustrating the presence of a supplementary monitoring effect on either the management or 
the largest shareholder, thereby reducing their private benefits of control. Consistent with the 
above, we find that wealth gains are lower the higher the shareholding of the second largest 




Sample Characteristics and Summary Statistics for 48 Investments of Private Equity 
Investors in Germany during the Period from 1998 till 2007 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Deviation  Median 
stake1  54.31%  29.02%  53.41% 
stake2  5.73%  6.87%  2.30% 
freefloat  32.81%  20.68%  35.33% 
management  13.02%  23.94%  0.00% 
market value of equity [thousands of Euros]  264,593  472,418  70,007 
leverage   9.66%  34.65%  14.62% 
taxshield  2.55%  9.64%  2.98% 
risk  0.026  0.011  0.024 
undervaluation  0.996  0.223  0.984 
 
Descriptive data for a sample of 48 investments of private equity (PE) investors in Germany. Financial data, such 
as total assets, leverage and tax shield are taken directly from each company‟s annual report in the fiscal year 
preceding the announcement of the transaction. Stock market data which is used to calculate the variables market 
value of equity, risk and undervaluation are obtained from Datastream. We further collected data on the ownership 
structure of the firms from Hoppenstedt Aktienführer, which lists all investors with a stake of at least 5% of the 
shares outstanding. The ownership data is used in order to calculate the variables management, stake1, stake2 and 
freefloat. Stake1 is defined as the largest equity stake in the year preceding the PE investors‟ announcement. 
Stake2 is defined as the second largest equity stake in the year preceding the PE investors‟ announcement. The 
freefloat is being determined by subtracting all shareholdings of investors with an interest of more than 5%. 
Management is the sum of all stakes of the firm‟s executive officers in the year preceding the PE investors‟ 
announcement. Leverage is computed as net debt/total assets. Taxshield is tax payments divided by the market 
value of equity (see Lehn/Poulsen 1988). Risk is measured as standard deviation of daily stock returns (over two 
years). Undervaluation is defined as the ratio of the closing market price two months prior to the announcement of 
the PE investment divided by the average price, measured over 250 trading days counting backwards from two 




Sample Characteristics for 48 Investments of Private Equity Investors in Germany 
during the Period from 1998 till 2007 
 
 
Ownership of the share 



















Family / Individual  16  33.33%  79.13%  89.51%  25.20% 
Other Corporation  12  25.00%  79.88%  92.02%  23.66% 
Widely held  11  22.92%  85.24%  100.00%  29.58% 
Financial Institutions 







All  48  100%  73.37%  86.75%  30.09% 
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Table 3 
 
Daily average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for 48 
investments of private equity investors in exchange-listed German companies 
 
Day 























  -20    0.11%    0.28    0.89    0.11%  24:24 
  -19    0.10%    0.25    0.17    0.21%  19:29 
  -18    -0.28%    -0.72    -0.35    -0.07%  24:24 
  -17    -0.09%    -0.23    -0.09    -0.16%  20:28 
  -16    0.66%    1.70    1.06    0.50%  26:22 
  -15    0.77%    1.99 **    1.30    1.27%  22:26 
  -14    -0.32%    -0.82    0.45    0.95%  23:25 
  -13    0.52%    1.35    0.88    1.47%  20:28 
  -12    0.28%    0.72    0.39    1.75%  24:24 
  -11    -0.16%    -0.42    -0.01    1.59%  25:23 
  -10    0.15%    0.40    0.71    1.74%  22:26 
  -9    -0.08%    -0.20    -0.77    1.66%  23:25 
  -8    0.23%    0.59    0.29    1.89%  22:26 
  -7    0.69%    1.77    1.67    2.57%  25:23 
  -6    0.14%    0.37    -0.06    2.71%  19:29 
  -5    0.21%    0.54    1.10    2.92%  21:27 
  -4    0.31%    0.80    0.27    3.23%  24:24 
  -3    0.58%    1.51    1.26    3.82%  26:22 
  -2    1.36%    3.50 ***    2.59 **    5.17%  26:22 
  -1    1.25%    3.23 ***    1.51    6.42%  28:20 
  0    5.90%    15.23 ***    4.45 ***   12.32%  33:15 
  1    1.68%    4.33 ***    2.12 **   14.00%  27:21 
  2    1.59%    4.11 ***    1.89   15.59%  26:22 
  3    0.44%    1.14    1.45   16.03%  23:25 
  4    -0.20%    -0.51    0.11   15.83%  26:22 
  5    0.10%    0.27    0.56   15.93%  25:23 
  6    0.24%    0.63    0.74   16.18%  21:27 
  7    0.14%    0.36    0.09   16.32%  18:30 
  8    -0.01%    -0.04    -0.69   16.30%  20:28 
  9    -0.57%    -1.47    -1.64   15.73%  20:28 
  10    -0.45%    -1.16    -1.82   15.29%  17:31 
  11    0.41%    1.06    1.25   15.70%  24:24 
  12    -0.09%    -0.22    0.36   15.61%  23:25 
  13    0.36%    0.92    1.08   15.97%  19:29 
  14    0.18%    0.47    1.00   16.15%  22:26 
  15    -0.17%    -0.44    -1.02   15.98%  16:32 
  16    -0.19%    -0.48    -0.69   15.80%  19:29 
  17    -0.12%    -0.32    -0.12   15.67%  22:26 
  18    -0.53%    -1.38    -2.50 **   15.14%  15:33 
  19    0.09%    0.24    0.08   15.23%  26:22 
  20    -0.28%    -0.73    -0.90   14.95%  19:29 
**significant at the 0.05 level, ***significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test)   28 
Column 1 lists a cut-out of the event window relative to the announcement day (t = 0), column 2 contains the 
daily average abnormal returns (ARs) for each event day. Columns 3 and 4 present the corresponding test 
statistics (t-Test and BMP-test). These statistics indicate whether the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return on 
a given day can be rejected or not. Cumulative daily average abnormal returns (CARs) are displayed in column 
5, while column 6 shows the ratio of positive and negative abnormal returns.  29 
Table 4 
 
Average cumulative abnormal returns and test statistics for several event periods.  
Panel A: Private Equity Investments   
Event Window  CAR  t-test statistic  BMP-test statistic 
[-1;1]    8.82%    13.16***    5.02*** 
[-2;+2]    11.77%    13.59***    5.76*** 
[-10;0]    10.73%    8.36***    5.09*** 
[-20;0]    12.32%    6.94***    5.21*** 
[-20;+20]    14.95%    6.03***    5.41*** 
 
Panel B: All Other Investments   
Event Window  CAR  t-test statistic  BMP-test statistic 
[-1;1]    1.76%    2.66***    2.11** 
[-2;+2]    3.10%    3.62***    2.72*** 
[-10;0]    2.17%    1.71*    1.38 
[-20;0]    1.88%    1.07    0.91 
[-20;+20]    5.11%    2.08**    1.69* 
 
Panel C: Differences in Means   
Event Window  CAR PE  CAR all others  t-value difference in means 
[-1;1]    8.82%    1.76%    1.72* 
[-2;+2]    11.77%    3.10%    2.88*** 
[-10;0]    10.73%    2.17%    5.29*** 
[-20;0]    12.32%    1.88%    9.69*** 
[-20;+20]    14.95%    5.11%    13.20*** 
*significant at the 0.10 level, **significant at the 0.05 level, ***significant at the 0.01 level 
 





  stake1  stake2  Management  undervaluation  leverage  taxshield  risk  majority  size 
stake1  1.0000                 
stake2  -0.6360  1.0000               
management  0.0443  -0.0465  1.0000             
undervaluation  0.0219  -0.0718  0.0727  1.0000           
leverage  -0.0575  0.0907  0.1325  0.0107  1.0000         
taxshield  0.0852  -0.1161  0.0321  0.1889  0.1008  1.0000       
risk  -0.2840  0.1653  0.0355  -0.1312  -0.2250  -0.0193  1.0000     
majority  0.2347  0.0240  0.0742  0.0025  -0.0618  -0.1284  -0.1714  1.0000   
size  0.2174  -0.2336  -0.1489  0.1266  -0.0714  -0.0519  -0.4970  -0.1606  1.0000 
 
This table contains correlation coefficients of all variables included in our basic regression model. Stake1 is defined as the largest equity stake in the year preceding the private 
equity (PE) investors‟ announcement. Stake2 is defined as the second largest equity stake in the year preceding the PE investors‟ announcement. Management is the sum of all 
stakes of the firm‟s executive officers in the year preceding the PE investors‟ announcement. Undervaluation is defined as the ratio of the closing market price two months prior 
to the announcement of the PE investment divided by the average price, measured over 250 trading days counting backwards from two months prior to the announcement of the 
PE investment. Leverage is computed as net debt/total assets. Taxshield is tax payments divided by the market value of equity (see Lehn/Poulsen 1988). Risk is measured as 
standard deviation of daily stock returns (over two years). Majority is a binary variable taking the value “1” if the PE investor bought the majority stake in the company and “0” if 
not. Size is defined as the natural logarithm of the firm‟s total assets in the year preceding the PE investment. The freefloat is being determined by subtracting all shareholdings of 
investors with an interest of more than 5%. 
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Table 6 
 












constant      0.652   (2.85) ***    0.690   (2.21) **    0.618   (2.58) ** 
stake1  -    -0.002  (-2.33)**    -0.002  (-2.26)**    -0.002  (-2.02)** 
stake2  -    -0.010  (-2.96)***    -0.011  (-3.06)***    -0.010  (-2.90)*** 
management  -    0.001   (0.94)    0.000   (0.54)    0.002   (0.77) 
undervaluation  -    -0.273  (-3.43)***    -0.240  (-2.24)**    -0.259  (-3.06)*** 
leverage  -    -0.153  (-2.90)***    -0.175  (-3.04)***    -0.152  (-2.86)*** 
taxshield  +    0.576   (3.09) ***    0.476   (2.20) **    0.564   (2.98) *** 
risk  -    -1.176  (-0.57)    -2.344  (-0.79)    -1.177  (-0.57) 
majority  +    0.047   (0.85)    0.000   (0.01)    0.045   (0.82) 
size  -    -0.011  (-0.80)    -0.018  (-1.11)    -0.010  (-0.72) 
management
2  +        -0.000  (-0.50) 
year dummies    no  yes  No 
N    48  48  48 
R
2     0.49  0.60  0.49 
F-statistic  
(p-Value)    4.06 (0.00)  2.38 (0.02) 
 
3.61 (0.00) 
**significant at the 0.05 level, ***significant at the 0.01 level 
 
OLS-regression of the CARs [-2;+2] on the variables stake1, stake2, management, undervaluation, leverage, 
taxshield, risk, majority, size, management
2, employees, reputation, delisting, family, corporation and stock 
market for 48 German private equity (PE) investments between June 1998 and June 2007. T-statistics are in 
parentheses. Stake1 is defined as the largest equity stake in the year preceding the PE investors‟ announce-
ment. Stake2 is defined as the second largest equity stake in the year preceding the PE investors‟ announce-
ment. Management is the sum of all stakes of the firm‟s executive officers in the year preceding the PE 
investors‟ announcement. Undervaluation is defined as the ratio of the closing market price two months prior 
to the announcement of the PE investment divided by the average price, measured over 250 trading days 
counting backwards from two months prior to the announcement of the PE investment. Leverage is computed 
as net debt/total assets. Taxshield is tax payments divided by the market value of equity (see Lehn/Poulsen 
1988). Risk is measured as standard deviation of daily stock returns (over two years). Majority is a binary 
variable taking the value “1” if the PE investor bought the majority stake in the company and “0” if not. Size 
is  defined  as  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  firm‟s  total  assets  in  the  year  preceding  the  private  equity 
investment. Management
2 is the variable management to the power of 2.  
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Table 7 
 













constant      0.634 (2.56)**    0.671 (2.69)**    0.427 (1.85)*    0.493 (2.14)** 
stake1  -    -0.002 (-2.30)**    -0.002 (-2.29)**       
stake2  -    -0.010 (-2.89)***   -0.010 (-2.88)***    -0.006 (-2.26)**    -0.007 (-2.47)** 
management  -    0.001  (0.93)    0.001  (0.92)      0.001 (0.91)    -0.000 (-0.06) 
undervaluation  -    -0.270 (-3.28)***   -0.275 (-3.39)***    -0.246 (-3.09)***    -0.223 (-2.71)*** 
leverage  -    -0.151 (-2.79)***   -0.153 (-2.86)***    -0.142 (-2.67)**    -0.124 (-2.31)** 
taxshield  +    0.582 (3.04)***   0.571 (3.00)***   0.562 (3.02)***    0.467 (2.51)** 
risk  -    -1.110 (-0.53)    -1.277 (-0.60)    -1.438 (-0.69)    -0.695 (-0.33) 
majority  +    0.048 (0.86)    0.045 (0.79)    0.035 (0.65)    0.015 (0.29) 
size  -    -0.010 (-0.65)    -0.012 (-0.81)    -0.009 (-0.68)    -0.012 (-0.92) 
reputation  +    -0.009 (-0.20)       
delisting  -      0.009 (0.20)     
family  -         0.035  (0.62) 
corporation  -         -0.040  (-0.66) 
stock market  +         0.122  (1.90)* 
freefloat  +       0.002 (2.20)**   
year dummies    no  no  no  no 
N    48  48  48  48 
R
2     0.49  0.49  0.49  0.53 
F-statistic  
(p-Value)   
3.57 (0.00)  3.57 (0.00)  4.02 (0.00)  3.71 (0.00) 
*significant at the 0.10 level, **significant at the 0.05 level, ***significant at the 0.01 level 
 
OLS-regression  of  the  CARs  [-2;+2]  on  the  variables  stake1,  stake2,  management,  undervaluation, 
leverage, taxshield, risk, majority, size, reputation, delisting, family, corporation and stock market for 48 
German  private  equity  investments  between  June  1998  and  June  2007. T-statistics  are  in  parentheses. 
Stake1  is  defined  as  the  largest  equity  stake  in  the  year  preceding  the  private  equity (PE)  investors‟ 
announcement. Stake2 is defined as the second largest equity stake in the year preceding the PE investors‟ 
announcement. Management is the sum of all stakes of the firm‟s executive officers in the year preceding 
the PE investors‟ announcement. Undervaluation is defined as the ratio of the closing market price two 
months prior to the announcement of the private equity investment divided by the average price, measured 
over 250 trading days counting backwards from two months prior to the announcement of the private equity 
investment. Leverage is computed as net debt/total assets. Taxshield is tax payments divided by the market 
value of equity (see Lehn/Poulsen 1988). Risk is measured as standard deviation of daily stock returns (over 
two years). Majority is a binary variable taking the value “1” if the PE investor bought the majority stake in 
the company and “0” if not. Size is defined as the natural logarithm of the firm‟s total assets in the year 
preceding the PE investment. Reputation is a binary variable taking the value “1” if the PE investor belongs 
to the largest PE investors in the world (measured as having capital invested larger than 5 billion $) and “0” 
if not. Delisting is a binary variable taking the value “1” if the PE investor takes the target firm private and 
“0” if not. Family, corporation and stock market are a binary variable taking the value “1” if the private 
equity  investor  bought  the  stake  in  the  company  from  the  respective  shareholder  and  “0”  if  not.  The 
reference group for the variables family, corporation and stock market is the variable financial institution. 
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Table 8 
 
Robustness check based on bootstrap procedure 
 
explanatory variable  expected sign  Model 1  Model 7 
constant 
   
   0.652*** 
[0.2463, 1.0575] 
   0.493 
[-0.0089, 0.9943] 
stake1 
  + 
-0.002** 
[-0.0035, 0.0004]   
stake2 
  - 
-0.010*** 
[-0.0162, -0.0036] 
  -0.007** 
[-0.0117, -0.0016] 
management 






  - 
  -0.273*** 
[-0.4381, -0.1079] 
  -0.223** 
[-0.3898, -0.0556] 
leverage 
  - 
  -0.152** 
[-0.2782, -0.0269] 
  -0.124 
[-0.2549, 0.0059] 
taxshield 
  + 
   0.576** 
[0.1658, 0.9856] 
   0.467* 
[0.0232, 0.9099] 
risk 


























  +   
0.112 
[0.0159, 0.2399] 
       
       
Number of Observations    48  48 
Number of Clusters    24  24 
Number of Replications    10,000  10,000 
*significant parameters are marked with an (*). 
 
Robust  OLS-regression  for  the  empirical  models  1  and  7  for  48  German  private  equity  (PE)  investments 
between June 1998 and June 2007. In parentheses are the confidence intervals at the 0.10 level for the estimated 
parameters based on 10,000 different bootstrap samples following MacKinnon (2002). Stake1 is defined as the 
largest equity stake in the year preceding the PE investors‟ announcement. Stake2 is defined as the second 
largest equity stake in the year preceding the PE investors‟ announcement. Management is the sum of all stakes 
of  the  firm‟s  executive  officers  in  the  year  preceding  the  PE  investors‟  announcement.  Undervaluation  is 
defined as the ratio of the closing market price two months prior to the announcement of the PE investment 
divided by the average price, measured over 250 trading days counting backwards from two months prior to the 
announcement of the private equity investment. Leverage is computed as net debt/total assets. Taxshield is tax 
payments  divided  by  the  market  value  of  equity  (see  Lehn/Poulsen  1988).  Risk  is  measured  as  standard 
deviation of daily stock returns (over two years). Majority is a binary variable taking the value “1” if the private 
equity investor bought the majority stake in the company and “0” if not. Size is defined as the natural logarithm 
of the firm‟s total assets in the year preceding the private equity investment. Family, Corporation and stock 
market are a binary variable taking the value “1” if the PE investor bought the stake in the company from the 
respective shareholder and “0” if not. 
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Figure I 
Average cumulative abnormal returns based on the Market Model for private 
equity and non-private equity investments 
 
 
   35 
References: 
 
Achleitner, A.-K. and Kaserer, C. (2005), Private Equity and Hedge Funds – A Primer, CEFS 
Working  Paper  Series,  No.  2005-3,  Center  for  Entrepreneurial  and  Financial  Studies, 
Technische Universität München. 
 
Andres, C. (2008), Large shareholders and firm performance - an empirical examination of 
founding-family ownership, Journal of Corporate Finance 14, 431-445. 
 
Andres, C. (2007), Family Ownership, Financing Constraints and Investment Decisions, 
Working Paper, University of Bonn.  
 
Andres, C., Betzer, A. and Weir, C. (2007), Shareholder wealth gains through better corporate 
governance  –  the  case  of  European  LBO  transaction,  Financial  Markets  and  Portfolio 
Management, 21, 403-424. 
 
Barclay, M. and Holderness, C. (1989), Private benefits from control of public corporations. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 371-95. 
 
Bebchuk, L. (1999), A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control,. NBER 
Working Paper 7203. 
 
Bessler, W. (1999) Equity returns, bond returns and equity premiums in the German equity 
market, European Journal of Finance, 6, 186-201 
 
Bessler, W. and Kurth, A (2007) Agency problems and the performance of venture-backed 
IPOs in Germany: exit strategies, lock up periods and bank ownership, European Journal of 
Finance, 16, 29-63. 
 
Bessler, W. and Thies,  S. (2007) The long run performance of initial  public offerings  in 
Germany, Managerial Finance, 33, 420-441. 
 
Betzer, A. (2006), Why Private Equity Investors Buy Dear or Cheap in European Leveraged 
Buyout Transactions, Kredit und Kapital, 39, 397-417.   36 
 
Boehmer, E., J. J. Musumeci und Poulsen, A. B. (1991), Event study methodology under 
conditions of event induced variance, Journal of Financial Economics, 30, 253-272. 
 
Brown,  S.  and  Warner,  J.  (1980),  Measuring  Security  Price  Performance,  Journal  of 
Financial Economics, 8, 205-258. 
 
Brown, S. and Warner, J. (1985) Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 3-31. 
 
CMBOR  (1999),  Quarterly  Review,  Winter,  Centre  for  Management  Buyout  Research, 
University of Nottingham. 
 
CMBOR  (2007),  Quarterly  Review,  Summer,  Centre  for  Management  Buyout  Research, 
University of Nottingham. 
 
Citron, D., Wright, M., Ball, R. and Rippington, F. (2003), Secured creditor recovery rates 
from management buy-outs in distress, European Financial Management, 9, 141-161. 
 
Cotter, J. and Peck, S. (2001), The structure of debt and active equity investors: the case of 
the buyout specialist, Journal of Financial Economics, 59, 101-147. 
 
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L. and Rice, E. (1984), Going private: minority freeze outs and 
stockholders‟ wealth, Journal of Law and Economics, 27, 367-402. 
 
Desbrieres, P. and Schatt, P. (2002), The impacts of LBOs on the performance of acquired 
firms: the French case, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 29, 695- 729. 
 
Easterwood, J., Singer, R., Seth, A. and Lang, D. (1994) Controlling conflict of interest in 
management buyouts, Review of Economics and Statistics, 76, 512-522. 
 
Edwards,  J.  S.  S.  and  Weichenrieder,  A.  J.  (2004),  Ownership  Concentration  and  Share 
Valuation, German Economic Review, 5, 143-171. 
   37 
Efron,  B.  and  Tibshirani,  R.  J.  (1993),  An  Introduction  to  the  Bootstrap,  Chapman  & 
Hall/CRC Boca Raton et al. 
 
Ehrhardt,  O.  and  Nowak,  E.  (2003),  Private  Kontrollrenten  in  deutschen  Familienunter-
nehmen, Die Betriebswirtschaft, 63, 363-377. 
 
Frankfurter,  G.  and  Gunay,  E.  (1992),  Management  buyouts:  the  sources  and  sharing  of 
wealth  between  insiders  and  outside  shareholders,  Quarterly  Review  of  Economics  and 
Finance, 32, 163-181. 
 
Franks, J. and Mayer, C. (2001), Ownership and control of German Corporations, The Review 
of Financial Studies, 14, 943-977. 
 
Franzke,  S.  (2004)  Undepricing  of  venture  capital  backed  and  non-venture  backed  IPOs: 
Germany‟s Neuer market in The Rise and Fall of Europe’s New Stock Markets, ed Guidici, G. 
and Roosenboom, P. (Elsevier). 
 
Goergen, M. and Renneboog, L. (2004), Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and 
cross-border takeover bids, European Financial Management, 10, 9-45. 
 
Grossman, S. and Hart, O. (1980), Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the 
corporation, The Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42-64. 
 
Halpern, P., Kieschnick, R. and Rotenberg, W. (1999), On the heterogeneity of leveraged 
going private transactions, Review of Financial Studies, 12, 281-309. 
 
Harrington,  S.  and  Shrider,  D.  (2007),  All  events  induce  variance:  Analyzing  abnormal 
returns when effects vary across firms, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42, 
229–256.  
 
Horowitz,  J.  L.  (1999),  The  Bootstrap,  Working  Paper,  prepared  for  the  Handbook  of 
Econometrics, 5, University of Iowa. 
   38 
Jensen  M.  (1986),  Agency  costs  and  free  cash  flow,  corporate  finance  and  take-overs. 
American Economic Review, 76, 323-329. 
 
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 305-360. 
 
Kaplan, S. (1989a). Management buyouts: evidence on taxes as a source of value, Journal of 
Finance, 64, 611-632. 
 
Kaplan,  S.  (1989b),  The  Effects  of  Management  Buyouts  on  Operating  Performance  and 
Value, Journal of Financial Economics, 24, 217-254. 
 
Kester, C., and Luehrman, T. (1995), Rehabilitating the leveraged buyout, Harvard Business 
Review, 73, 119-130. 
 
Kieschnick, R. (1998),  Free cash  flow and stockholder  gains  in  going  private transaction 
revisited, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 25, 187-202. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (2002), Investor Protection and 
Corporate Valuation. Journal of Finance, 57, 1147-1170. 
 
Lehn, K.  and Poulsen,  A. (1989),  Free  cash  flow and stockholder  gains  in  going private 
transactions, Journal of Finance, 44, 771-787. 
 
Lichtenberg, F.R. and Siegel, D. (1990), The effects of leveraged buyouts on productivity and 
related aspects of firm behaviour, Journal of Financial Economics, 26, 165-194. 
 
Lowenstein, L. (1985), Management buyouts, Columbia Law Review, 85, 730-784. 
 
MacKinnon, J. (2002), Bootstrap inference in econometrics, Canadian Journal of Economics, 
35, 615-645. 
 
Maupin, R. (1987), Financial and stock market variables as predictors of management buy-
outs, Strategic Management Journal, 8, 319-327.   39 
 
Maupin,  R.,  Bidwell,  C.  and  Ortegren,  A.  (1984),  An  empirical  investigation  of  the 
characteristics  of  publicly  quoted  corporations  which  change  to  closely  held  ownership 
through management buyouts. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 11, 345-359. 
 
McConnell,  J.  J.  and  Servaes,  H.  (1990),  Additional  Evidence  on  Equity  Ownership  and 
Corporate Value, Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 595-612. 
 
Morck,  R,  A.  Shleifer  and  Vishny,  R.  W.  (1988),  Management  Ownership  and  Market 
Valuation, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315. 
 
Opler,  T.  (1993),  Controlling  financial  distress  costs  in  leveraged  buyouts  with  financial 
innovations, Financial Management, Autumn, 79-90. 
 
Renneboog, L., Simons, T. and Wright, M. (2007), Why do firms go private in the UK? 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 13, 591-628. 
 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1986), Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, The Journal of 
Political Economy, 94, 461-488. 
 
Shleifer,  A.  and  Vishny,  R.  (1997),  A  Survey  of  Corporate  Governance,  The  Journal  of 
Finance, 52, 737-783. 
 
Short,  H.  and  Keasey,  K.  (1999),  Managerial  Ownership  and  the  Performance  of  Firms: 
Evidence from the UK, Journal of Corporate Finance, 5,  79-101. 
 
Thomsen, S., Pedersen, T. and Kvist, H. K. (2006), Blockholder Ownership: Effects on Firm 
Value in Market and Control Based Governance Systems. Journal of Corporate Finance 12, 
246-269. 
 
Travlos, N. and Cornett, M. (1993), Going private buyouts and determinants of shareholders‟ 
returns, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 8, 1-25. 
   40 
Weir, C. and Laing, D. (1999), Management buyouts: the impact of ownership changes on 
performance, Small Business and Enterprise Development, 5, 261-269. 
 
Weir,  C.,  Laing,  D.  and  McKnight,  P.  J.  (2002),  Internal  and  external  governance 
mechanisms:  their  impact  on  the  performance  of  large  UK  public  companies.  Journal  of 
Business Finance and Accounting, 29, 579-611. 
 
Weir, C. M., Laing, D. and Wright, M. (2005), Undervaluation, private information, agency 
costs and the decision to go private, Applied Financial Economics, 15, 947-961. 
 
Weir, C., Wright, M. and Scholes, L. (2008), Public-to-private buy-outs, distress costs and 
private equity. Applied Financial Economics (forthcoming). 
 
Wright, M. and Robbie, K. (1998), Venture capital and private equity: a review and synthesis, 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 25, 521-570. 
 
Wright, M., Weir, C. and Burrows, A. (2007), Irrevocable commitments, going private and 
private equity, European Financial Management, 13, 757-775. 
 
Zingales, L. (1994), The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange, 
Review of Financial Studies, 7, 125-48. 
 